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Abstract: This paper makes a pioneering attempt to provide a theory of determination of 
interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a 
three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal 
sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ 
labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs 
labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal 
credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour 
raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in 
the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-
intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, 
therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.  
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Endogenous Capital Market Imperfection, Informal Interest Rate Determination 
and International Factor mobility in a General Equilibrium Model   
 
1.  Introduction 
 
There exists financial dualism in less developed countries (LDCs) like India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, etc. with two different credit markets – formal credit market consisting of 
banks, co-operatives etc. and informal credit market consisting of professional 
moneylenders, traders, landlords etc. The formal credit market is competitive and 
supplies credit to the organized production sectors of the economy at relatively low rates 
of interest. On the contrary, the informal credit market is characterized by high degrees of 
imperfection and is found to be the major source of credit to the unorganized production 
sectors like agriculture, urban informal sectors etc. Professional moneylenders, having 
local monopolistic power, charge exorbitantly high rates of interest1 to their borrowers.  
 
The theoretical literature dealing with the interaction between the formal credit market 
and informal credit market consists of two groups. Contributions like Chaudhuri and 
Gupta (1996), Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997), and Chaudhuri (1998, 2001, 2004) analyze 
interaction between the two credit markets in the presence of corruption in the loan 
delivery system in the formal credit market. Rent-seeking behaviour of the formal lender 
lowers the availability of formal credit and thus a demand for informal credit is created.  
On the other hand, works like Bose (1998), Hoff and Stiglitz (1996), Floro and Roy 
(1997), Jain (1999) and Chaudhuri and Ghosh Dastidar (2011a, b) consider vertical 
linkages between the two credit markets. Here informal sector lenders act as financial 
intermediaries between the formal credit agency and the final borrowers of credit. 
However, models belonging to this literature are built in static one period partial 
equilibrium framework and deal with a pure agrarian economy. Hence these models 
neither can focus on the simultaneous determination of all factor prices nor can analyse 
                                                 
1
 The informal interest rate could be as high as 40 per cent or even 120 per cent per annum. See 
Basu (1998) and Bedbak (1986) in this context. 
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the effects of various exogenous changes taking place in the different non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy. 
 
A complete static one period deterministic general equilibrium model incorporating the 
interaction between these two credit markets as well as the interdependence between the 
urban development and the rural development is found in Gupta (1997). This model 
provides a framework to analyze the effect of various urban development policies on the 
relative development of these two credit markets.2 However, Gupta (1997) assumes 
informal capital3 to be mobile between the urban informal manufacturing sector and the 
informal rural sector and keeps formal capital to be specific to the formal manufacturing 
sector. The formal manufacturing sector in that model faces a fixed high wage; but the 
wage rate is flexible in the two informal sectors.4 Furthermore, the two capital markets in 
that model are completely disintegrated and there is no scope for formal credit to flow 
into the informal credit market. Also the informal credit market is assumed to be 
competitive in that model while there are several theoretical and empirical works 
emphasizing the imperfection in this credit market.5 Credit transaction is often 
interlinked with other transactions like output transactions and labour transactions. 
Professional moneylenders have local monopoly power. Lenders have imperfect 
information about their borrowers. Also the literature does not comprise of any general 
equilibrium models that provide a theory of determination of the informal interest rate 
                                                 
2
 This treatment of dichotomy between the formal-informal credit markets is also available in 
Chaudhuri (2003) which studies the welfare consequences of different liberalized economic 
policies in a small open economy setting.  
 
3
 Capital means working capital borrowed from the capital market. 
 
4
 There exists a substantial literature on informal manufacturing sector which consists of Chandra 
and Khan (1993), Grinols (1991), Datta Chaudhuri (1989), Gupta (1993, 1997), Chaudhuri (2006, 
2005, 2004, 2003, 2000a), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009), Chaudhuri and Banerjee 
(2007), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2007, 2006) , and many others. 
 
5
 See for examples, Bhaduri (1977), Bardhan (1984), Bardhan and Rudra (1978), Sarap (1991), 
Bottomley (1975), Basu (1984, 1998), Basu and Bell (1991), Bell (1988), Bose (1998), 
Chaudhuri (2004, 2001, 2000b, 1998), Chaudhuri and Ghosh Dastidar (2011a, b) and many 
others. 
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starting from the behaviour of the informal sector lender in an imperfectly competitive 
credit market. An informal lender borrows funds from the formal credit market and 
relends it to the informal borrowers; and in the process maximizes net interest income. So 
a part of the formal credit enters into the informal credit market; and hence two credit 
markets are not completely disintegrated. The limitations in the model of Gupta (1997) 
justify the need for further research in this area introducing imperfection in the informal 
credit market as well as integration between the formal and the informal credit markets.  
 
The present paper develops a static general equilibrium model of a small open economy 
consisting of three sectors - a formal, an informal and a rural (agricultural). The informal 
sector produces a non-traded intermediate good for the formal sector while the other two 
sectors produce two internationally traded final commodities. The formal credit market 
that supplies capital to the formal sector is assumed to be competitive like Gupta (1997). 
However, we introduce imperfection in the informal credit market that supplies capital to 
the informal and rural sector producers. The informal lender is a price maker in the 
informal credit market. Also the two credit markets are not disintegrated and capital can 
flow from one market to the other because the informal lender obtains capital from the 
formal credit market. In Gupta (1997), the supply of capital to the informal sector is 
perfectly inelastic. Any inflow of foreign capital necessarily goes to the urban formal 
sector in Gupta (1997)6 while in the present model it may flow into both credit markets. 
In Gupta (1997), labour moves from the rural sector to the informal sector following the 
Harris-Todaro (1970) migration mechanism. However, in the present model, labour is 
perfectly mobile.  
 
The present analysis derives some interesting results that are new in the theoretical 
literature on informal credit market. An inflow of foreign capital, given the endowment 
of labour, unambiguously raises both the price of the informal sector’s product and the 
informal interest rate but lowers the formal interest rate as well as the wage rate in the 
informal labour market. Similar results are obtained when an emigration of labour takes 
place given the capital endowment of the economy. So either the foreign capital inflow or 
                                                 
6
 Chaudhuri (2003) model also shares the same limitation. 
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the emigration of labour aggravates the extent of formal-informal wage gap as well as the 
interest rate gap between the two credit markets. So, degrees of distortions in both the 
factor markets are increased following inflows of foreign capital and/or emigration of 
labour.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. Subsection 2.1 
analyzes the behaviour of the monopolistic lender who is the only source of capital in the 
informal credit market. Subsection 2.2 describes the equational structure of the general 
equilibrium model. Section 3 presents the comparative static effects with respect to 
changes in capital and labour endowments. Finally, concluding remarks are made in 
section 4.  
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a small open developing economy with three production sectors: one formal 
sector and two informal sectors. One of the two informal sectors (sector 1) produces an 
internationally traded commodity, 1X , whose price, 1P , is internationally given. However, 
the other informal sector (sector 2) produces a non-traded intermediate good, 2X , for the 
formal sector. The formal sector produces an internationally traded manufacturing 
commodity, 3X . Labour is homogeneous and measured in labour time unit. Capital is also 
homogeneous and is measured in terms of machine hour. Capital and labour are the two 
primary inputs in each of these three sectors. Factor prices and the price of the non-traded 
good are measured in terms of a traded good. Markets other than the formal sector labour 
market and the informal sector credit market are perfectly competitive. The representative 
firm in each of these three sectors maximizes profit. Factor endowments                               
are given exogenously. Labour and capital move freely across different sectors. There are 
imperfections in the market for labour in the formal sector. Workers in sector 3 are 
unionized and they receive a high fixed wage, *W , while their counterparts in the two 
 6 
informal sectors earn only a flexible competitive wage,W with *W W> .7 Workers first 
try to get employment in the formal sector as it offers a high wage. Those who are not 
successful are automatically absorbed in the two informal sectors owing to complete 
flexibility of the informal wage rate,W . The two informal sectors do not have any access 
to the formal capital market where the rate of return to capital is denoted by r ;and hence 
are compelled to fall back upon the informal credit market, monopolized by a 
moneylender, where and the interest rate is denoted by R .  The per-unit requirement of 
the intermediate input in sector 3 is assumed to be technologically fixed.8,9 Sector 1 and 
sector 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin sub-system (HOSS) because both informal 
capital and labour are perfectly mobile between these two sectors.10 Sector 2 uses capital 
more intensively vis-à-vis sector 1. However, sector 3 is the most capital-intensive sector 
in the economy. Production functions in all the three sectors exhibit constant returns to 
                                                 
7
 Firms in the formal sector face unionized labour market. One of the most important roles of the 
labour unions is to bargain with their respective employers in respect of the betterment of the 
working conditions.  Through offer of negotiation, threat of strike, actual strike etc. the trade 
unions exert pressure on the employers (firms) in order to secure higher wages, reduced hours of 
work, share in profits and other benefits. Organized workers in large firms leave no stones 
unturned so as to reap wages higher than their reservation wage i.e. the informal sector wage. See 
Bhalotra (2002) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009) in this context.  
 
8
 It rules out the possibility of substitution between the non-traded intermediate good and other 
factors of production in sector 3. Although this is a simplifying assumption, it is not totally 
unrealistic. In industries like shoe making and garments, large formal sector firms farm out their 
production to the small informal sector firms under the system of subcontracting. So the 
production is done in the informal sector firms while labeling, packaging and marketing are done 
by the formal sector firms. One pair of shoes produced in the informal sector does not change in 
quantity when it is marketed by the formal sector as a final commodity. Thus there remains a 
fixed proportion between the use of the intermediate good and the quantity of the final 
commodity produced and marketed by the formal sector. See Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 
(2009) in this context.   
 
9
 Even though the non-traded input-output ratio ( 23a ) in sector 3 is technologically given, labour 
and capital are substitutes and the production function displays the constant returns to scale 
property in these two inputs. 
 
10
 Heckscher-Ohlin sub-system (HOSS) in the general equilibrium model of a small open 
economy is defined as a sub-system consisting of two sectors with at least two intersectorally 
mobile factors of production. However, we are not using this model to explain international trade 
following Heckscher-Ohlin theory.  
 
 7 
scale11 with positive and diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. Owing to our 
small open economy assumption, prices of both the final goods are given internationally 
in the sense that these are determined in the international market and are parameters to a 
small open economy. However, as sector 2 produces a non-traded intermediate good, its 
price, 2P , is determined domestically by equating its supply to demand in the home 
market.. Finally, we assume that labour and capital are imperfectly substitutes to each 
other in all the sectors.  
 
2.1 The moneylender’s behaviour  
 
The moneylender, being the only source of informal credit, enjoys monopoly power in 
the informal credit market. He borrows funds from the formal credit market at the interest 
rate, r , and lends it to the informal sector producers at the interest rate, R . The aggregate 
demand for informal credit of the moneylender, denoted B , is given by                                                                        
1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )K KB a W R X a W R X= + ,       (1) 
where Kja and jX are the capital-output ratio and output level in the j th sector for. 1, 2j = .  
W and R stand for the informal wage rate and the informal interest rate, respectively. We 
assume production functions in all the sectors to satisfy all the standard neo-classical 
properties including constant returns to scale; and the representative firm maximizes 
profit being price-takers in the factor markets. So the input-output coefficients are 
functions ofW and r .The level of demand for informal loan, B , is measured in terms of 
commodity 1 which is the unit of account here.  
 
The moneylender’s net interest income is assumed to be fully refunded; and hence the 
risk of default is ignored for the sake of simplicity12. It is given by 
                                                 
11
 See footnotes 8 and 9 in this context.  
 
12
 Bottomley (1975), Bhaduri (1977), Basu (1984) etc. emphasize the problem of lender’s risk in 
the informal credit market. If there is a risk of default, the expected net interest income should be 
considered and attitude towards risk aversion also becomes important. We ignore this realistic 
problem because we consider a deterministic competitive equilibrium framework and; such a 
deterministic framework is often used to analyze the problem of less developed economies.  
 8 
1 1 2 2( ) ( )[ ( , ) ( , ) ]M K KY R r B R r a W R X a W R X= − = − + .    (2) 
The monopolist moneylender maximizes his net interest income through a choice of R . 
He has no control over W and r ; and these variables are treated as parameters in his 
maximization process. The first-order condition of maximization of net interest income is 
given by 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( ) [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] 0L L L LM K K K K K K
dY r r
a X S S a X S S
dR R R
= − + + − + = .   (3) 
This implies that the change in net interest income of the moneylender (with respect to 
the informal interest rate, R ) must be zero in equilibrium. 
 
Here MY is a concave function of R because 
2 2 2
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 22 2 2
2( )= - [ ] ( )[( ) ( ) ] 0.L Lm K KK K K K
d Y a aS a X S a X R r X X
dR R R R
∂ ∂
+ + − + <
∂ ∂
 
Here ( . )
k
ijk k
ij k
k ij
a wS
w a
∂
=
∂
is the elasticity of the i th factor-output coefficient ( ija ) in the j th 
sector ( 1, 2j = ) with respect to the k th factor price ( kw for ,k L K= ). 1LKS and 2LKS are 
positive but
2
1
2
Ka
R
∂
∂
and
2
2
2
Ka
R
∂
∂
are negative. So
2
2 0
md Y
dR
< and hence mY is a concave function 
of R . 
 
From equation (3) we have13  
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
(1 ) (1 ) 2[ ] ( ) 0(1 ) (1 )
L L
K K K K
L L
K K K K
a X S a X S R r
a X S a X S r
+ + + −
= − <
− + −
.     (3.1) 
 
So from equation (3.1) it follows that either 
1 1 1 2 2 2(1 ) (1 ) 0L LK K K Ka X S a X S− + − < ;    
or,             (3.2) 
11
L
KS≤  and 21
L
KS≤ ,  
                                                 
13
 See Appendix I for derivation of equation (3.1). 
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with at least one being a strict inequality.                                   
 
2.2  The general equilibrium analysis 
 
The price sub-system of this general equilibrium model is represented by the following set of 
equations: 
1 1 1L KWa Ra+ = ;         (4) 
2 2 2L KWa Ra P+ = ;         (5) 
and, 
3 2 2 23 3* L KW a ra P a P+ + = .        (6) 
where jP stands for the relative price of the j th good for 2,3j = (measured in terms of 
commodity 1); and, 23a stands for the per unit requirement of the intermediate good in 
sector 3. Each of these three equations represents the competitive equilibrium condition 
in the corresponding product market. The left-hand side of each of these three equations 
represents average cost; and, under constant returns to scale technology, average cost is 
same as marginal cost. Competitive equilibrium is attained when price is equal to 
marginal cost.   
 
The quantity sub-system of the general equilibrium model is described by the following 
set of equations. 
1 1 2 2 3 3L L La X a X a X L+ + = ;        (7) 
1 1 2 2 3 3K K K D Fa X a X a X K K K+ + = + = ;      (8) 
and, 
23 3 2a X X= .          (9) 
 
The left-hand side of equation (7) (equation (8)) represents the level of demand for labour 
(capital). Equations (7) and (8) are the full-employment conditions for labour and capital, 
respectively. This full-employment in factor markets is ensured by perfect flexibility of 
factor prices. 23 3a X represents the level of demand for the intermediate good. Equation 
(9) represents the demand-supply equality condition in this non-traded intermediate good 
 10 
market. Perfect flexibility of the price of the non-traded good ensures this equality in 
equilibrium. The capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic capital ( DK ) and 
foreign capital ( FK ) which are perfect substitutes.14 Equation (3) is the first-order 
condition of maximization of the net interest income of the moneylender.  
 
The general equilibrium set-up consists of seven endogenous 
variables, 2 1 2, , , , ,W R r P X X and 3X , and exactly the same number of independent 
equations, namely equation (3) and equations (4) – (9). The solution mechanism is the 
following. W and R are determined from equations (4) and (5) as functions of 2P . Then 
1 2, ,r X X and 3X are determined from equations (3), (6), (7) and (8) simultaneously as 
functions of 2P . Finally, 2P  is solved from equation (9). 
 
3. Comparative statics  
 
Here we examine the effects of an inflow of foreign capital and/or of an emigration of 
labour on factor prices. The conventional wisdom as obtained from competitive 
equilibrium analysis made by Grinols (1991), Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1997) 
etc. suggests that an inflow of foreign capital must lead to an expansion of the formal 
sector and draw labour from the informal sectors resulting in an increase in the informal 
sector wage rate. The formal and informal interest rates should go down as the supply of 
capital is increased given its demand. On the other hand, an emigration of labour lowers 
the availability of labour in the source country and should raise the informal sector wage. 
The labour-intensive informal sectors are expected to contract for scarcity of labour and 
release capital to the formal sector leading to an expansion of the latter. The interest rate 
in the informal sector should go down while the formal interest rate should go up. We are 
going to show that these results are not so straightforward in this model for two reasons: 
                                                 
14
 It may be mentioned that this assumption has been widely used in the theoretical literature on 
trade and development. See Gupta (1994, 1997), Khan (1982), Chandra and Khan (1993), 
Chaudhuri (2003, 2005), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009), Chaudhuri et al. (2006) among 
others. 
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(i) there is monopoly in the informal credit market; and, (ii) there is a non-traded 
intermediate good produced by sector 2 having a complementary relationship with the 
product produced by the formal sector (sector 3). This complementary relationship has 
been considered by Marjit (2003), Chaudhuri (2003), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 
(2009, 2014) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006). 
 
Differentiating both sides of equations (4) – (6) we obtain 
1 1
ˆ ˆ 0L KW Rθ θ+ = ;                                                                                                         (4.1) 
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
L KW R Pθ θ+ = ; and,        (5.1) 
2 23 2 3
ˆ ˆ
ˆK r P Pθ θ+ = .         (6.1) 
Here “^” means proportional change e.g. ˆ ( )dxx
x
= . 
 
Similarly, total differentials of equations (7) – (9) yield the following equations. 
1 1 2 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
L L LX X X Lλ λ λ+ + = ;        (7.1) 
1 1 2 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
K K KX X X Kλ λ λ+ + = ; and,       (8.1) 
2 3
ˆ ˆX X= . 15          (9.1) 
Solving equations (4.1) and (5.1) we find   
1
2
ˆ ˆ( )KW Pθ
θ
= − ;                    (10) 
and, 
1
2
ˆ ˆ( )LR Pθ
θ
= .          (11) 
Here ijθ is the distributive share of the i th factor in the j th sector e.g. 22
2
( )KK
Ra
P
θ = . ijλ is 
the share of the i th factor allocated to the j th sector. We assume that 
1 2 2 1( ) 0L K L Kθ θ θ θ θ= − > . This implies that the non-traded intermediate good-producing 
                                                 
15
 This is so because 23a is a constant. 
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informal sector (sector 2) is more capital-intensive than the traded good-producing 
informal sector (sector 1) in both physical and value sense. 
 
Differentiating both sides of equations (3), (6.1), (7.1) and (8.1), simplifying and 
arranging them in a matrix notation, we have16 
23 23
2 1 1 1 3 2
L3 3 L1 L2 L3 2 4 2
K3 3 K1 K2 K3 3 5 2
ˆˆ
          0      0       0
ˆ ˆA           A   -A      0
ˆ ˆ ˆS            ( )
ˆS        ˆ ˆ( )
K
K
L
L
K
r P
X A P
X L A P
X K A P
θθ
λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ λ
   − 
   
   
=    
−   
  
−   +   
;     (12) 
where, 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2[(1 ) ] [(1 ) ]L L L LK K K K K K
r rA a X S S a X S S
R R
= − + = − − + ; 
2 1 1 1 2 2 2( )( ) 0L LK K K K
rA S a X S a X
R
= + > ; 
2 2
1 2
3 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
1( )[ { ( ) ( )}L L K KK K K K K
a aA a X S a X S R r W X X
R W R W
θ
θ
∂ ∂
= + + − +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
  (13) 
                
2 2
1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 22 2{2( ) ( ) ( )}] 0L L K KL K K K K
a a
a X S a X S R r R X X
R R
θ ∂ ∂+ + − − + >
∂ ∂
; 
1 1 2 2
4 ( ) 0
K K
L L L LS SA λ λ
θ
+
= > ; 
1 1 2 2
5 ( ) 0
L L
K K K KS SA λ λ
θ
+
= > ; 
 
Solving the set of equations given by (12) we obtain the following expressions. 
23
2
3
ˆ
ˆ ( )
K
r Pθ
θ
= − ;          (14) 
2
1 3 3 23 2 2 3 3 2 1 23 3 3 3 3
ˆ
ˆ ( )[( )( ) { ( )K LK L K L K L K L K
PX A A A S Sθ θ λ λ λ λ θ λ λ= + − + +
∆
 
                 
3 1 3 3 1 3
3 3 4 3 5
ˆ ˆ( )}] ( ) ( )K L K KK K L
A AA A K Lθ λ θ λθ λ λ− + − +
∆ ∆
;   (15) 
                                                 
16
 The derivations of the set of equations (12) are available from the authors on request. 
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2
2 3 1 4 3 5 3 3 3 1 3 3 1
ˆ
ˆ ( )[ ( ) ( )K K L K L K L K
PX A A A Aθ λ λ θ λ λ λ λ= − + + −
∆
 
                                     23 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3{ ( ) ( )}]K LL K L K L K L KA A S Sθ λ λ λ λ λ λ+ − − +   (16) 
                              
3 3 1 3 3 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( )K K K LA AL Kθ λ θ λ+ −
∆ ∆
; 
and, 
2
3 3 5 1 2 4 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 1
ˆ
ˆ ( )[ { ( ) ( )} ( )K L L K K K L K L K
PX A A Aθ λ λ λ λ θ λ λ λ λ= + + + + −
∆
 
                        23 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 3 1 2 3{ ( ) ( ) ( ) }]K LL K L K L K K L K L L KA A S A Sθ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ+ − − + − +  
                                  
3 1 3 1
1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( )( ) ( )( )K KL L K K
A AK Lθ θλ λ λ λ+ + − +
∆ ∆
.   (17) 
Here ∆ is the determinant of the coefficient matrix given in (12). Here  
3 1 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1[( ) ( )]K L K L K L K L KAθ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ∆ = − + −      (18.1)  
 
By assumption, sector 3 is the most capital-intensive sector. Hence 
2 3 3 2L K L Kλ λ λ λ> and 1 3 3 1L K L Kλ λ λ λ> . It can be shown that a necessary condition for having 
a normal (positive) price-supply response in sector 2 is that 1 0A < 17.  If 1 0A < from 
(18.1) we can write 
3 1 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1[( ) ( )] 0K L K L K L K L KAθ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ∆ = − + − <      (18.2) 
 
As sector 2 produces an internationally non-traded intermediate good and as the product 
price is perfectly flexible, then its market must clear domestically. For the equilibrium in 
the intermediate good market to be Walrasian stable, it requires that 
3 2
2 2
ˆ ˆ
( ) ( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
X XD
P P
= − < .                                   
                                                 
17
 This is available from the authors on request 
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Here D  represents the rate of change in the excess demand for the intermediate good; 
and, it must be negative to satisfy the stability of equilibrium. Using equations (16) and 
(17) and simplifying the stability condition, we must have18  
3 1 4 5 3 3 23 2 1 2 3 1 2 3
1( )[ ( ) ( ){ ( ) ( )}K K L K K K L LD A A A A Aθ θ θ λ λ λ λ λ λ= + + + + − +∆  
                                                        23 1 3 3 3 3( )] 0K LL L K KA S Sθ λ λ− + < .   (19) 
In equilibrium the demand for the non-traded intermediate good must equal its supply. 
Totally differentiating both sides of equation (9) one obtains 
3 2
ˆ ˆX X= .          (20) 
 
Using equations (16), (17) and (20) we have  
3 1
2
ˆ ˆ( )K AP K
D
θ
= −
∆
 when ˆ 0L = ;        (21) 
and,        
3 1
2
ˆ ˆ( )K AP L
D
θ
=
∆
 when ˆ 0K = .        (22) 
 
Substituting the expression for ∆ from equation (18.2) in equations (21) and (22), we find 
the following expressions. 
2
2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1
ˆ 1( ) [ ]
ˆ [( ) ( )]L K L K L K L K
P
DK λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
= −
− + −
;     (23) 
and, 
2
2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1
ˆ 1( ) [ ]
ˆ [( ) ( )]L K L K L K L K
P
DL λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
=
− + −
.     (24) 
Here 2
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
P
K
>  and 2
ˆ
( ) 0
ˆ
P
L
<  because 2 3 3 20, L K L KD λ λ λ λ< > and, 1 3 3 1L K L Kλ λ λ λ> . Equations 
(23) and (24) help us to establish the following proposition. 
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 Interested readers may derive equation (19) of their own or can request for proofs from the 
authors on request.  
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Proposition 1: An increase in the capital (labour) endowment, given the labour (capital) 
endowment, unambiguously raises (lowers) the price of the non-traded intermediate 
good.  
 
Here an inflow of foreign capital leads to an expansion of the capital stock while an 
emigration of labour from the source country lowers its labour endowment. The intuitive 
explanations of Proposition 1 are fairly straightforward. The production structure here is 
an indecomposable one. Therefore factor prices depend on both commodity prices and 
factor endowments.  Sector 1 and sector 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem 
(HOSS) as they use the same two inputs. Besides, there is a perfect complementary 
relationship between products of sector 2 and sector 3. From equations (15) – (17) we 
find that any change in a factor endowment affects the output composition through a 
Rybczynski effect and through a change in the price of the non-traded intermediate 
good, 2P . The latter produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect and a subsequent Rybczynski 
type effect in the HOSS which in turn produces an indirect impact on the output 
composition of the different sectors. An increase in capital endowment leads to an 
expansion of the most capital-intensive sector (sector 3) and contraction of both the 
informal sectors. In equations (15) – (17), these changes are captured by the terms 
containing ˆK . As sector 3 expands, the demand for the non-traded intermediate good 
produced by sector 2 rises while its supply falls. This unambiguously raises the price of 
the non-traded good, 2P . On the contrary, if the labour endowment rises (falls) sector 3, 
being the least labour-intensive sector, contracts (expands) while the two informal sectors 
expand (contract). The demand for the non-traded input goes down (up) while its supply 
goes up (down). Consequently, 2P falls (rises) unequivocally.   
 
Using equations (10), (11) (14), (23) and (24) we obtain effects of changes in K and L  on 
factor prices. These effects are described as follows.  
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
K PW
K K
θ
θ
= − <  ;        (25) 
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1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
L PR
K K
θ
θ
= > ;         (26) 
23 2
3
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
K
Pr
K K
θ
θ
= − < ;        (27) 
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
K PW
L L
θ
θ
= − >  ;        (28) 
1 2
ˆˆ
( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
L PR
L L
θ
θ
= < ;         (29) 
and, 
23 2
3
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( )( ) 0
ˆ ˆ
K
Pr
L L
θ
θ
= − > .        (30) 
 
0θ > , by assumption; and, any 0ijθ > , by definition. Equations (23) and (24) give us the 
expressions and mathematical signs of 2
ˆ
( )
ˆ
P
K
and 2
ˆ
( )
ˆ
P
L
. Thus we can sign the above-
mentioned six expressions.  All these results can be summarized in terms of the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2: An increase (a decrease) in the endowment of capital (labour) given the 
endowment of the other factor, leads to (i) an increase in the informal interest rate; (ii) a 
decrease in the formal interest rate; and, (ii) a fall in the informal wage rate. 
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. An increase in the capital 
endowment raises the price of the non-traded intermediate good, 2P . This produces a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect in the HOSS raising the informal interest rate ( R ) and lowering 
the informal sector wage (W ) as the intermediate good-producing informal sector (sector 
2) is assumed to be more capital-intensive than the agricultural good producing informal 
sector (sector 1). The formal interest rate, r , must fall so as to satisfy the zero-profit 
condition in sector 3.19 An increase in capital endowment, given its demand, exerts a 
                                                 
19
 See equation (6). 
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downward pressure on the formal interest rate in this sector. The effects of a change in 
the labour endowment on factor prices can easily be explained following the reverse 
mechanism. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have developed a three-sector static general equilibrium model of a small 
open economy with distortions in the labour market as well as in the capital market. The 
informal capital market is different from the formal capital market in the sense that the 
latter being competitive in nature supplies capital to the formal sector firms while the 
former being monopolistic in nature provides funds to the informal and rural sector 
producers. We, however, do not consider the Harris-Todaro (1970) type rural-urban 
migration and unemployment of labour. 
 
We obtain a few interesting results. If the intermediate good producing informal sector is 
more capital-intensive than the agricultural good producing informal sector, an increase 
in the capital stock and/or a decrease in labour endowment would lower the wage rate in 
the informal labour market as well as the interest rate in the formal credit market but 
raises the interest rate in the informal capital market. Thus degrees of distortion in both 
the factor markets are aggravated in this case. This result is different from that we obtain 
in Gupta (1997) model where an increase in the capital stock and/or a decrease in labour 
endowment raises the informal wage rate and lowers the interest rate in the informal 
credit market when there is Harris-Todaro (1970) type induced migration and the labour 
sending rural sector is more capital-intensive than the labour receiving urban informal 
sector. No unambiguous results on factor prices in the informal sector can be obtained in 
Gupta (1997) when the urban informal sector is more capital-intensive than the rural 
sector. Moreover, there is a major difference in the mechanism of working between these 
two models. In Gupta (1997), changes in factor endowments affect factor prices through 
the Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium condition, but in the present model, 
corresponding effects are generated through movement in the price of the non-traded 
good.   
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Finally, there are some restrictive assumptions embodied in the present analysis. There is 
no induced migration and unemployment which are two salient features of an LDC. Also 
the labour input is homogeneous and there is no distinction between workers with respect 
to their skills. Also some of the essential characteristics of the informal credit market like 
interlinkages with other markets are missing. Besides, the informal credit market is 
fragmented oligopolistic in nature and there is a segment in the credit market where 
informal lenders compete with each other20. Future research in this area should address 
these issues.   
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